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The adjustment mechanisms of multinational firms are of interest in the context of the relaxation 
of barriers to inward investment in relatively low-wage economies. This paper provides new 
empirical evidence on the effects of overseas foreign direct investment on the structure of 
multinational firms’ home-country operations. It also provides micro-level evidence on the 
home-country effects of outward investment for the UK. 
The paper focuses on plant exit, since plant closures and cross-border relocation are important 
adjustment margins for multinational firms. It presents evidence that UK multinationals 
investing abroad in low-wage economies are acting in line with the predictions of theories of 
vertical foreign direct investment. More specifically, it examines whether investment abroad in 
relatively low-wage economies is associated with plant closures in relatively low-skill, labour-
intensive industries at home; in line with low-skill intensive production being relocated to low-
wage economies.  
The paper makes comparisons across industries and firms akin to a difference-in-differences 
analysis. It finds that plants in low skill-intensity sectors owned by UK multinationals investing 
in low-wage economies are significantly more likely to exit than those owned by UK 
multinationals that are not investing in low-wage economies, and importantly, that this 
difference is not mirrored for plants in high-skill sectors.  
The paper also confirms previous findings that multinational firms, either domestic or foreign-
owned, are more likely to shut down plants than non-multinational firms, and hence exhibit 
more flexibility in organisational restructuring.
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Abstract: I use within-firm, plant-level data combined with geographic information on firms’ 
overseas operations to examine how investment in low-wage economies affects firms’ home-
country operations. To remain close to theory I focus on changes in firms’ organisational and 
industrial structure driven by plant closures. As predicted by models of vertical multinationals I 
find that investment in relatively low-wage economies is associated with plant closures in 
relatively low-skill, labour-intensive industries in the UK. The findings are of interest in the 
context of the relaxation of barriers to inward investment in low-wage economies.  
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  11  Introduction 
Understanding the adjustment mechanisms of multinational firms is important in the context of 
the relaxation of barriers to inward investment in low-wage economies, such as China’s 
accession to the WTO in 2001. The OECD (2006) now highlights China as a major destination 
for FDI outside the OECD area, with estimated inflows of $72 billion in 2005. How 
multinational firms structure their operations globally is also of considerable interest because 
they make up a substantial proportion of employment in OECD economies. Bernard and Jensen 
(2005) report that US multinationals account for 26% of manufacturing employment in the US; 
in Great Britain in 2001 UK-owned multinationals accounted for 20% of manufacturing 
employment, with foreign-owned multinationals accounting for a further 25% (Griffith, Redding 
and Simpson, 2004). International restructuring can potentially affect large numbers, and 
particular groups of workers, and is of considerable interest to governments. 
In this paper I provide new empirical evidence on the effects of overseas foreign direct 
investment (FDI) on the structure of multinational firms’ home-country operations. I focus on 
vertical FDI and on plant exit, since plant closures and cross-border relocation are important 
adjustment margins for multinational firms. An innovative feature is that my data allow me to 
exploit within-firm, plant-level information on firms’ organisational and industrial structure in 
combination with firm-level information on the geographic composition of their overseas 
investment activity. The paper provides novel evidence on outward FDI and within-firm 
adjustment in the industrial mix of home-country activity. I also provide micro-level evidence 
on the home-country effects of outward investment for the UK. 
The question I investigate comes directly from the theory of vertical FDI. I examine whether 
investment abroad in relatively low-wage economies is associated with plant closures in 
relatively low-skill, labour-intensive industries at home. That is, I look for evidence in line with 
low-skill intensive production being relocated to low-wage economies. To do this I make 
comparisons across industries and firms akin to a difference-in-differences analysis. I 
demonstrate that plants in relatively low-skill industries in the UK that are owned by 
multinationals investing in low-wage economies are more likely to shut down compared to 
plants in the same industry owned by firms that are not investing in low-wage economies and 
compared to plants in relatively high-skill industries owned by the same group of firms, and also 
that within high-skill industries there is no difference in the propensity to exit across plants 
owned by the two types of firm. 
  2Figure 1 presents some first-pass evidence from my raw data that, within low-skill industries, 
plants owned by UK multinationals (UK-MNEs) investing in low-wage economies have a 
higher propensity to exit than those owned by other firms, and that this is not the case in high-
skill industries. For each group of industries the figure shows the probability of exit for four 
different types of plants: domestic-owned; plants owned by a foreign-owned multinational; 
plants owned by UK-MNEs that are investing in low-wage economies; and plants owned by 
UK-MNEs that are not investing in low-wage economies. This is based on the cohort of plants 
active in the UK manufacturing sector in 1998, and plants are categorised on the basis of their 
characteristics in each year. The left panel shows the relatively high probability of exit among 
plants in low skill-intensity industries owned by UK-MNEs investing in low-wage economies 
(UK-MNE low wage). To demonstrate that this is not simply the result of a general higher 
propensity to exit among plants owned by this type of firm across all industries, the right panel 
shows exit propensities among plants in high-skill industries. Here there is no marked 
difference. I confirm this finding in my econometric analysis below. 
Figure 1. Probability of plant exit by industry skill-intensity and firm ownership type 
 
Note: Skill-intensity is measured using the proportion of employees in a 4-digit industry with no qualifications. 
Low and high skill-intensity sectors are the top and bottom third of industries ranked on this measure. Figure based 
on the population of manufacturing plants present in 1998. 
Source: author’s calculations using ARD plant population and AFDI data (source: ONS) to identify plant exit and 
ownership type. Industry skill-intensity derived from the UK Labour Force Survey. 
 
  3The paper extends and combines two existing strands of the literature. First, research on the 
home-country effects of outward investment such as Head and Ries (2002), which finds that 
investment in relatively low-wage economies is associated with an increase in the skill-intensity 
of firms’ home activities as predicted by theory of vertical FDI. While Head and Ries (2002) use 
data on multinationals’ home-country activities at the firm level, I use plant-level data allowing 
me to observe plant closures within firms across different industries. This permits an 
investigation of an important adjustment mechanism through which the documented firm-level 
increases in skill-intensity of production may come about, and of within-firm industrial 
restructuring that is directly related to the theory of vertical multinationals locating different 
activities geographically according to comparative advantage. 
Because of the focus on closures, this research also contributes to the literature on plant exit, 
multinational firms and organisational structure such as Bernard and Jensen (2005), which finds 
that plants owned by multinational firms are significantly more likely to exit than purely 
domestic plants once their superior performance characteristics are accounted for.
1, 2  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the theoretical background, the 
main hypothesis to be examined and my econometric approach. Section 3 describes the data and 
presents some descriptive statistics. Section 4 details the results and a series of robustness 
checks and section 5 concludes.  
2  Outward FDI and within firm adjustment 
2.1  Theoretical and empirical background 
The theoretical literature on multinational enterprises (MNEs) differentiates between horizontal 
FDI, the replication of home country activity abroad in proximity to customers as a substitute 
for exporting, and vertical FDI, locating different stages of the production chain, or for multi-
product firms locating the production of different goods, geographically according to countries’ 
comparative advantage.
3 In practice MNEs can undertake both types of overseas investment 
                                                 
1 Disney, Haskel and Heden (2003b) using UK data find that, without conditioning on other characteristics, stand-
alone establishments are more likely to exit than establishments that are part of larger groups. 
2 This paper is also related to the literature on the effects of import competition on plant performance. Bernard, 
Jensen and Schott (2006) show that import competition from low-wage economies is associated with an increased 
probability of plant death, decreasing employment and industry switching into more capital-intensive sectors. 
Bernard, Redding and Schott (2006) also emphasise the importance of product switching in output growth. 
3 Examples of models of horizontal multinationals are Markusen, (1984) and Brainard (1997) and of vertical 
multinationals, Helpman (1984, 1985); Venables (1999) contains elements of both types of activity. 
  4simultaneously, however horizontal and vertical FDI have different implications for the skill-
intensity of an MNE’s home-country operations. 
The key difference is that while horizontal FDI, the replication of either all stages of production 
activity or of downstream production abroad to serve a particular market, could imply an 
increase in the skill-intensity of production at home (either through the manufacture of low skill-
intensity products abroad that would otherwise have been produced at home and exported, or 
through the expansion of headquarter or R&D services at home), this would be expected to 
occur irrespective of the economic characteristics of the host economy. Whereas, if firms are 
engaging in vertical FDI, locating stages of production or the production of different goods in 
different economies according to comparative advantage, effects on home country operations 
would be expected to be systematically related to the economic characteristics of host 
economies relative to those of the home country. 
Under vertical FDI firms would be expected to locate (low) skill-intensive activities in (low) 
skill-abundant countries. Hence the relocation of activity to a relatively low skill-abundant, low-
wage country would be expected to be associated with an increase in the skill-intensity of 
production at home. Empirical evidence exists in support of this. Head and Ries (2002), using 
data on outward investment by Japanese firms, find that an increase in investment in relatively 
low per-capita GDP economies was associated with an increase in the skill-intensity of firms’ 
employment in Japan. Brainard and Riker (1997) and Riker and Brainard (1997) also find 
evidence consistent with MNEs engaging in vertical FDI. They find that labour in affiliates in 
high-income countries is a substitute for labour in affiliates in other high-income countries (i.e. 
countries with similar skill levels) and a complement for labour in low-wage economies. They 
also find evidence that labour in low-wage economies competes to carry out those activities 
most sensitive to labour costs. Braconier and Ekholm (2000) find some evidence that home 
country employment in Swedish multinationals is a substitute for employment in affiliates in 
high-income host countries.
4
What is pertinent for my analysis is how the theory predicts this relationship comes about. 
Vertical FDI concerns locating specific activities within  the firm according to countries’ 
                                                 
4 Further research in this area includes Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2003) who do not find strong evidence that 
parent and affiliate employment within U.S. multinationals are substitutes. See also Chapter 9 of Barba-Navaretti 
and Venables (2004) for a summary of research on home-country effects of outward FDI. Yeaple (2003) provides 
an industry-level analysis which finds a role for comparative advantage in explaining the pattern of U.S. outward 
FDI. 
  5comparative advantage. Hence it is appropriate to use within-firm data to ascertain whether 
investment in low-wage economies is associated with a decrease in the extent to which MNEs 
carry out relatively low-skill activities at home.
5
2.2  Estimation approach 
My aim is to examine whether outward investment in relatively low-wage economies is 
associated with firms closing plants in relatively low-skill industries in the home country 
economy. To do this I use panel data at the plant level from which I can identify exit, combined 
with information on the location of overseas investment at the firm level, where a firm 
encompasses one or more plants in the home country potentially operating across a range of 
industries. All estimation is carried out on plants operating in the UK. 
The approach I take is akin to a difference-in-differences specification. For identification 
purposes the underlying assumption is that in the absence of vertical FDI behaviour, the 
propensity to close plants in low skill-intensity industries relative to high skill-intensity 
industries should be the same, both for firms that are investing in low-wage economies and for a 
control group of firms that are not, conditional on observable characteristics. I estimate a probit 
model of plant death given by: 
)
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where  Dit,t+s is a one-zero indicator variable that takes the value one if the plant exits (is 
observed for the final time in the population) in the periods t to t+s. Xit is a vector of plant 
characteristics which may be related to the propensity to exit. FOit, UKmneLit and UKmneHit are 
dummy variables indicating that, in period t, a plant is an affiliate of a foreign-owned MNE, is a 
plant owned by a UK-MNE that is investing in a low-wage economy or is a plant owned by a 
UK-MNE that is not investing in a low-wage economy, respectively.
6 The omitted category is 
plants that are part of firms that are not multinationals. Indj, are industry dummies which will 
                                                 
5 See Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter (2005) for an analysis of within-firm trade and vertical production networks, 
which exploits variation across affiliates operating in the same industry in different locations owned by the same 
firm. 
6 Note that UK-MNEs defined as investing in low-wage economies may also be investing in high-wage economies. 
  6control for factors such as the degree of import competition facing firms in the industry, and tt, 
and rr are time and region dummies. I cluster standard errors at the firm level. 
The main parameter of interest is  2 δ on the interaction term between the UKmneLit indicator and 
SIj, which is a measure of the skill intensity of the industry j in which the plant operates. For 
plants owned by firms that are investing abroad in low-wage economies the propensity to exit is 
expected to be decreasing in the skill intensity of the industry. This relationship should also be 
stronger compared to the other comparison groups, i.e. compared to  1 δ  and  3 δ , the coefficients 
on the other interaction terms. If this is the case then those firms that are investing in low-wage 
economies are significantly more likely to close down plants in low-skill industries relative to 
plants in high-skill industries, than the three potential control groups of firms (those that are not 
part of MNEs, those that are affiliates of foreign-owned MNEs and those that are owned by 
other UK-MNEs not investing in low-wage economies).
7 Although I am not relying on time-
series variation in my data, this analysis is akin to a difference-in-differences specification, 
because it compares the difference in the propensity to exit in high versus low skill-intensity 
industries across plants owned by different types of firm.
8
To clarify, define  and   as the propensity of plants owned by UK-MNEs investing in low-
wage economies to exit in low and high skill-intensity industries respectively, and   and   
as the equivalent propensities for plants owned by firms not investing in low-wage economies. 

















lw P P P P DD − − − =                      ( 2 )  
where DD would be expected to be positive. Moreover, this difference across firm types in 
relative propensities to exit across industries should be driven specifically by UK-MNEs 
                                                 
7 I am not able to determine whether the parents of foreign-owned affiliates in the UK are investing in low-wage 
economies. To the extent that they are, this would make them a worse control group and make it more difficult to 
detect a difference in exit behaviour between them and UK-MNEs investing in low-wage economies. 
8 An alternative approach would be to exploit time-series information in firms’ overseas investment decisions and 
control for non time-varying plant or firm-level unobservable characteristics. Identification would come through 
within-firm time-series variation in investment decisions. I do not take this approach due to the short time span of 
the data and the absence of information on investment scale, making it difficult to identify new investment abroad 
or changes in the extent of investment. Also I do not exploit any exogenous variation for example in countries’ 
regulations with respect to inward FDI, hence the findings should be primarily taken as providing evidence on 
firms’ behaviour rather than the causal response to a reduction in barriers to FDI. 
  7investing in low-wage economies having a higher propensity to close plants in low skill-
intensity industries compared to other types of firms.
9 Re-arranging (2) as, 








lw P P P P DD − − − =                      ( 3 )  
this implies that it is the first term in brackets in (3) that should be positive. To confirm this I 
replace the interactions with SIj with interactions with dummy variables indicating in which 
third of the skill-intensity distribution an industry lies. This enables me to ascertain that the 
results are driven by MNEs investing in low-wage economies having a higher propensity to 
close plants in low skill-intensity industries (rather than a lower propensity to close plants in 
high-skill sectors). 
One issue is choosing the appropriate control group of firms. I present results using the three 
different types of firm described above as control groups and also just using UK-MNEs that are 
not investing in low-wage economies as controls. The latter may make a closer comparison 
group in terms of underlying characteristics. Moreover, Bernard and Jensen (2005) identify 
home-country multinationals in general as having a higher propensity to exit compared to purely 
domestic firms. I also carry out a number of further exercises and robustness checks. I 
investigate alternative measures of investment in low-wage economies, and check robustness 
against a range of indicators of industry skill-intensity. 
3  Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1  Overseas investment 
I use information on overseas investment from the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
Annual Inquiry into Foreign Direct Investment (AFDI) to identify UK multinational firms and 
to derive indicators of whether or not they are investing in low-wage economies. The AFDI 
register contains annual information on the population of firms undertaking outward investment 
from the UK and on the country of location of their overseas subsidiaries, associates and 
branches.
10 I use the register data over the period 1998 to 2001.  
                                                 
9 That is, it should not be driven by UK-MNEs investing in low-wage economies having a lower propensity to close 
plants in high-skill industries than other types of firm.  
10 No information on the size or industry of the affiliate is provided. A subsidiary is an overseas company where the 
UK parent holds the majority of the voting rights and can exercise a dominant influence, an overseas associate 
company is one where the UK parent holds at least 10% of the voting rights and can exercise a significant 
influence, and a branch is a permanent overseas establishment defined for the purpose of UK tax and double 
taxation agreements. This is a fixed place of business abroad through which the UK company operates but which is 
not a subsidiary or associate company. Affiliates of foreign-owned firms located in the UK are also observed to 
  8I use these data to identify where UK-MNEs are investing, and by combining this with data on 
those countries’ GDP per capita relative to that in the UK I create firm-level indicators for 
investment in low-wage economies. The main indicator I use is a dummy variable equal to one 
if a firm has overseas operations in any country with per capita GDP of less than 10% of that in 
the UK in a particular year. However in doing this I exclude overseas operations in countries 
designated as tax havens. This is because the register is used for the purpose of collecting FDI 
data which relate to all financial flows to overseas affiliates, rather than just those relating to 
investment in fixed capital assets. These, along with the countries with per capita GDP less than 
10% of the UK where I observe overseas affiliates, are listed in table A1 in the Appendix.  
3.2  Plant exit and organisational structure  
My second data source is the plant population data from the British Annual Respondents 
Database (ARD).
11 The main analysis is carried out using information for the population of 
manufacturing plants for 1998 to 2002, on employment, age, 5-digit industry, ownership and 
firm structure. The AFDI information can be linked to the ARD data at the firm level.
12  
I define a plant as exiting in year t if t is the final year it is observed in the population. Exit is 
defined as closure; if instead a plant were taken over, and not closed, it would remain in the 
population the following year.  In estimation I pool two, two-year cross sections of data for the 
years 1998-1999 and 2000-2001. Hence I use two cohorts, those plants present in 1998 and 
those present in 2000, and for each cohort a plant is classified as an exitor if it exits in t or t+1.  
The two year time period provides a close link between the observed characteristics in year t and 
the exit decision. As a robustness check I also use the cohort of plants present in 1998 and 
measure exit over a four year period.  
                                                                                                                                                            
make outward investments from the UK. These remain classified as foreign-owned. The population of firms in the 
register increases over the period. Part of this may be due to the inclusion of outward investors that were previously 
missing from the register. This may mean I mis-classify some UK-MNEs as domestic firms, but this should only 
act to make it harder to identify differences in behaviour between the different firm types.
11 See Barnes and Martin (2002) and Griffith (1999) for a full description. It is a legal requirement for firms to 
respond to the ARD survey. The ARD contains indicators of whether a UK-based plant is owned by a foreign 
multinational. This information is collected alongside the outward AFDI investment data. The definition of foreign 
direct investment used for statistical purposes in collecting the inward and outward FDI data is, “investment that 
adds to, deducts from or acquires a lasting interest in an enterprise operating in an economy other than that of the 
investor, the investor’s purpose being to have an “effective voice” in the management of the enterprise. (For the 
purposes of the statistical inquiry, an effective voice is taken as equivalent to a holding of 10% or more in the 
foreign enterprise.).” Office for National Statistics (2000). 
12 See Criscuolo and Martin (2003) and Griffith et al. (2004) for analyses using these linked data. 
  9I also use the plant population data to construct characteristics following other studies of plant 
exit, including age and size (log employment), (see Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson 1988, 1989 
and Disney, Haskel and Heden, 2003b). Bernard and Jensen (2005) emphasise the importance of 
controlling for firm structure variables. I construct three indicators of multi-plant firms: whether 
a plant is part of a firm with other plants in the same 5-digit manufacturing industry (multi_ind); 
whether the plant is part of a firm with plants in other 5-digit manufacturing industries 
(multi_man); and, whether the firm is also active in the business services sector (multi_bus). All 
refer only to activity in the UK. These categories are not mutually exclusive. A plant belonging 
to a firm with all three of these characteristics can have values of one for all three of the dummy 
variables. 
One issue is the extent to which I am able to control for other characteristics that could underlie 
the estimated pattern of exit propensities. Unobservable characteristics at either the firm or plant 
level that may be correlated with investment in low-wage economies and the propensity to close 
plants in low skill-intensity sectors may pose a potential problem. To overcome this to some 
extent I use an alternative dataset, which allows me to control for characteristics such as total 
factor productivity in line with Bernard and Jensen (2005), but which is less satisfactory in 
capturing exit accurately. 
More detailed characteristics, such as productivity and capital intensity, can only be obtained by 
using the ARD establishment-level sample, where an establishment can comprise more than one 
plant in the same line of business under common ownership. I only use these data as a 
robustness check. This is for two reasons. First, because establishments can comprise more than 
one plant, exit of individual plants can be understated for multi-plant establishments.
13 Second, 
while my main analysis uses data on the population of plants, the detailed establishment-level 
data are only available for a sample. The way the sample is structured means that the probability 
of being sampled increases with establishment size, and hence the sample may be biased 
towards growing, surviving plants.  
For each sampled establishment I calculate capital intensity as log capital stock per employee, 
and total factor productivity using a Cobb-Douglas index measure.
14 I supplement this with 
                                                 
13 This is potentially problematic given that establishments that are part of multinationals are more likely to 
comprise more than one plant. 
14 Capital stock information not collected directly. It is constructed using the perpetual inventory method from 
establishment-level data on investment expenditure for three classes of assets, plant and machinery, vehicles and 
buildings. See Martin (2002) for details. 
  10information on establishment exit and on organisational structure constructed from basic data on 
the population of establishments that is comparable to the information on the population of 
plants detailed above. 
3.3  Industry characteristics 
I derive my main measure of industry skill intensity from the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS). I 
use a measure of the proportion of employees in an industry who report having no 
qualifications. I create a time-invariant average at the 4-digit industry level using data from 1995 
to 2003.
15 The average share of employees with no qualifications is shown for 2-digit industries 
in table A2 in the Appendix. The sectors with the lowest skill-intensities include clothing, 
leather, textiles and rubber and plastics. 
I create a range of other measures to check robustness. First, an alternative measure from the 
LFS, the proportion of employees in an industry who are qualified to degree level equivalent 
and above. Second, three measures derived from the ARD establishment-level sample. These are 
the share of the total wage bill that is accounted for by skilled workers (administrative, technical 
and clerical workers) as opposed to unskilled workers (operatives), a measure of capital stock 
per worker, and the average annual wage. I construct these at the 5-digit industry level, using 
appropriate sampling weights, for the year 1995.
16 The wage bill share of skilled workers 
mirrors the measure used in Head and Ries (2002). Finally I use an alternative measure of 
wages. The average hourly wage at the 4-digit level derived from the UK Annual Survey of 
Hours and Earnings (ASHE) for 1997. 
3.4  Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics for the data on the population of plants used in the 
main analysis. The data tabulated are averaged over the two cohorts of plants present in 1998 
and 2000. Characteristics are shown for plants owned by four different types of firm: domestic 
only, foreign-owned multinationals, UK-owned multinationals investing in low-wage economies 
(defined as those with per capita GDP less than 10% of the UK), and UK-owned multinationals 
that are not investing in low-wage economies. 
                                                 
15 I average over the LFS spring quarters for these years to increase the sample sizes on which the measure is based. 
Although it is an industry-level measure there is a concern that it will be affected by firm behaviour (exit) during 
this period. In my robustness checks I use other measures constructed using data which pre-date the analysis period. 
16 These measures pre-date the main estimation period. 1995 is the last year for which the wage bill information is 
split by administrative, technical and clerical workers and operatives. 
  11Table 1. Descriptive statistics plant population by ownership type, 1998, 2000 
  Domestic 
 
Foreign-MNE Low  wage 
UK-MNE  
Not low wage 
UK-MNE 
Observations  338,977 8,682  4,228 6,687 
% exit t or t+1 23%  23% 24%  24% 
Age (years)  5.80   
(4.64) 
9.13   
(6.84) 
9.68   
(7.24) 
9.55   
(7.09) 
Employment 14.59    
(57.11) 




128.33   
(255.93) 
Multi_ind 0.11    
(0.31) 
0.61   
(0.49) 
0.86   
(0.35) 
0.72   
(0.45) 
Multi_man 0.04    
(0.20) 
0.16   
(0.36) 
0.14   
(0.34) 
0.23   
(0.42) 
Multi_bus 0.05    
(0.21) 
0.43   
(0.50) 
0.93   
(0.26) 
0.78   
(0.42) 
Mean share no qualifications  0.16   
(0.08) 
0.14   
(0.07) 
0.14   
(0.07) 
0.16   
(0.08) 
% in low skill / high skill industries  27% / 35%  23% / 48%  22% / 60%  34% / 40% 
Note: calculations carried out over two cohorts of plants present in 1998, 2000. Age is truncated at 21 years. Unless 
otherwise stated the table shows means with standard deviations in parentheses.  
Source: author’s calculations using ARD plant population and AFDI data (source: ONS), and the LFS. 
The first characteristic shown is the proportion of plants that exit in a two-year period (either in 
1998-1999 or in 2000-2001). On average this is very similar across plants of different ownership 
types at 23 or 24 percent.
17,18 The table also shows that plants that are not part of multinationals 
are on average younger and much smaller than those owned by multinationals. As expected they 
are also much less likely to be part of multi-plant firms.  
The final two rows provide information on the distribution of plants across industries according 
to the skill intensity of the industry (measured by the share of employees with no qualifications 
derived from the LFS). The average plant skill intensity is similar across the different ownership 
types at 0.14 to 0.16, a higher value indicating a higher share of workers with no qualifications 
and hence lower skill intensity. Finally, I rank the 4-digit industries by the industry-level skill 
intensity measure and split them into thirds. The final row reports the proportion of plants within 
each ownership category falling into the low skill-intensity third of industries and the high skill-
intensity third. This shows that UK-multinationals investing in low-wage economies are, along 
with foreign-owned multinationals, the least likely to be operating UK plants in low skill-
                                                 
17 For comparison Disney et al. (2003a,b) report an exit rate using the establishment-level ARD population data of 
around 20% per annum over the period 1986-1992 for the UK. Bernard and Jensen (2005) report an exit rate of 
around 35% for US manufacturing plants over a 5-year period. 
18 A potential concern is the accuracy with which the ARD population data records true exit. There may be lags 
between true exit and the records being updated. This should not present a problem for analysis. Exit may be 
recorded in a more timely manner for plants that are part of larger firms such as multinationals, but this would only 
create a bias if exit were recorded more or less accurately for plants in particular industries within particular types 
of firms, which is unlikely to be the case. 
  12intensity manufacturing sectors and the most likely to be operating UK plants in high skill-
intensity sectors. This presents a first piece of evidence in line with these firms engaging in 
vertical FDI. 
Table 2 presents further descriptive information in line with the findings of Head and Ries 
(2002), of outward investment to low-wage economies being associated with an increase in the 
skill-intensity of activity in the home country at the firm level. I take all firms present in 1998 
and split them into the four ownership groups as above according to their characteristics in that 
year. The table shows how UK plants and employment in these firms are distributed across 
industries by skill-intensity in 1998 and again, to the extent that they survive, in 2002.  
Table 2. Distribution of plants and employment across industries by firm type, 1998 cohort 
  Distribution of plants and employment across industries 
  Domestic 
 
Foreign-MNE Low  wage 
UK-MNE 




  1998 2002 1998 2002 1998 2002 1998 2002 1998 2002 
Plants            
Low  skill  intensity  28% 27% 23% 25% 23% 14% 35% 32%  52  30 
Med.  skill  intensity  37% 37% 29% 30% 17% 20% 27% 23%  66  40 
High  skill  intensity  35% 35% 47% 46% 60% 65% 37% 45%  66  39 
Total (thousands)  174  104  4 2 3 2 3 2  184  109 
            
Employment            
Low  skill  intensity  37% 37% 21% 22% 23% 14% 39% 32%  1,362 701 
Med.  skill  intensity  31% 32% 42% 38% 22% 24% 28% 27%  1,274 704 
High  skill  intensity  32% 31% 38% 40% 55% 62% 33% 41%  1,441 809 
Total (thousands)  2,653  1,446  633 328 415 215 375 225  4,077  2,214 
Note: figures are calculated for the cohort of manufacturing firms present in 1998. Table shows the distribution of 
plants and employment across industries in 1998 and 2002 by firm ownership type. 
Source: author’s calculations using ARD plant population and AFDI data (source: ONS), and the LFS. 
 
The table shows that the distribution of plants and employment in both types of UK-MNEs is 
shifting towards higher-skilled industries, however the rate is greater for UK-MNEs investing in 
low-wage economies. Starting from a base of 23% of employment in low-skill industries, this 
latter group of firms exhibit a 9 percentage point (or 39%) fall in the proportion of their 
employment in low skill-intensity sectors. This compares to a fall of 7 percentage points (or 
18%) from a higher base of 39%, for UK-MNEs that were not investing in low-wage economies.  
The pattern for the distribution of plants is similar with UK-MNEs investing in low-wage 
economies exhibiting a 9 percentage point fall in the proportion in low-skill sectors, compared 
to a 3 percentage point fall for UK-MNEs not investing in low wage economies. The table also 
emphasises that although they make up a small proportion of total manufacturing plants (3% in 
1998), UK-MNEs make up a substantial proportion of employment (19% in 1998). 
  13Table 3 examines net entry (plant entry taking account of offsetting plant exit) within narrowly-
defined industries for the same group of firms. The first column shows the average number of 
plants that each type of firm owns within a 5-digit industry sector, within each third of the 
industry skill-intensity distribution. For example in 1998 domestic firms owned on average 1.11 
plants in a low-skill 5-digit industry, and the same type of firm (but not necessarily the precise 
same firms) owned on average 1.08 plants in a high-skill 5-digit industry. The second column 
shows the net entry rate between 1998 and 2002. That is, for every one plant present in 1998, it 
shows for that same group of firms the relative increase or decrease in that number 5 years later. 
As these are negative they indicate that this cohort of firms is reducing the number of plants they 
own in these industries. A figure of minus 0.5 implies that for every two plants present in 1998 
only one plant is present in 2002.
19   
Table 3. Net entry by firm type and industry, firms present in 1998 
  Net entry, 1998 to 2002 
  Domestic 
 
Foreign-MNE Low  wage 
UK-MNE 
Not low wage 
UK-MNE 




























Low skill intensity  1.11 -0.46 1.46 -0.51 3.32 -0.71 2.66 -0.58 
Medium skill intensity  1.05 -0.42 1.86 -0.53 2.54 -0.58 2.16 -0.57 
High skill intensity  1.08 -0.44 2.20 -0.45 5.24 -0.50 2.30 -0.49 
Note: Figures are calculated for the cohort of manufacturing firms present in 1998. The table shows the average 
number of plants per 5-digit sector in 1998, and 5-year net entry rate by ownership and industry skill-intensity.  
Source: author’s calculations using ARD plant population and AFDI data (source: ONS), and the LFS. 
The main point to note is the particularly high net exit rate for plants in low-skill industries that 
are owned by UK-MNEs operating in low-wage economies. At –0.71, this net exit rate is 
significantly higher than for other types of firms in low-skill industries, and significantly higher 
than for the same type of firm in high-skill industries. This, together with the evidence in table 
2, implies that higher entry is not counteracting the results presented on exit below. 
4  Results 
I now detail the results of the probit estimation. Table 4 presents results building up to the 
specification shown in equation (1). The table shows marginal effects with z-ratios reported in 
                                                 
19 While the net exit rates look very high it should be noted that they are calculated for a single cohort of firms 
present in the manufacturing sector in 1998. New firms will be entering over the period 1999 to 2002 to offset exit 
from the 1998 cohort, which means that the figures should not be taken as implying a sharp decline in the total 
number of manufacturing plants over the period. In the data total employment in manufacturing in 2002 was 3.6 
million compared to 4.1 million in 1998, and the total number of plants was 175 thousand in 2002 compared to in 
184 thousand in 1998. 
  14parentheses. The first column confirms the findings of Bernard and Jensen (2005) for the UK. I 
find that plants that are part of multi-plant firms and plants that are part of multinational firms 
are more likely to exit than those that are single plant firms or part of firms that only operate in 
the UK. While Bernard and Jensen (2005) did not distinguish plants that are affiliates of foreign-
owned multinationals, I find some evidence to indicate that UK affiliates of foreign-owned 
multinationals are more likely to exit than plants owned by UK-MNEs (although this difference 
is not statistically significant). This is perhaps not surprising as multinationals may adjust 
employment in affiliates abroad more readily than in the home country, (see for example Görg 
and Strobl, 2003 and Fabbri, Haskel and Slaughter, 2003 for similar findings). In line with other 
studies I also find that plants that are younger are more likely to exit, as are plants that are 
smaller in terms of employment. In Column (2) I split UK-MNEs into two different types, those 
investing in low-wage economies and those that are not, however I find no statistically 
significant difference between the estimated coefficients for the two types of firm. 
Column (3) shows the main specification from equation (1). I interact each of the three 
ownership dummies with the skill-intensity of the industry in which the plant is operating.
20 
Skill intensity is measured by the share of the workforce with no qualifications, hence a higher 
value indicates lower skill-intensity. I find that, compared to other types of multinational firms, 
the propensity of UK-MNEs investing in low-wage economies to close plants varies 
significantly with the skill-intensity of the industry. More specifically, UK-MNEs investing in 
low-wage economies have a higher propensity to close plants in low-skill intensity industries 
relative to high-skill intensity industries consistent with them engaging in vertical FDI.  
The marginal effect on the interaction term for low-wage UK-MNEs (0.529) is significantly 
different to that on the interaction term for foreign-owned MNEs (0.052) and that on the 
interaction term for UK-MNEs not investing in low-wage economies (0.116) at the 1% and 5% 
level respectively. The marginal effect of 0.529 implies that for an increase in the industry skill-
intensity measure (i.e. an increase in the proportion of employees in the industry with no 
qualifications) of 0.1, (the mean for the estimation sample is 0.16, and the standard deviation 
                                                 
20 I do not include the skill-intensity measure directly in this specification as it varies only at the 4-digit industry 
level as do the industry dummies. The results are very similar using 3-digit industry dummies plus the industry 
skill-intensity measure.  
  150.08), there is an increase in the propensity to exit for plants owned by UK-MNEs investing in 
low-wage economies of around 5 percentage points.
21
Column (4) estimates only on the sub-sample of plants owned by UK-MNEs and hence uses 
only those UK-MNEs not operating in low-wage economies as the control group. Using this set 
of firms there is no longer sufficient variation to identify the coefficient on the multi_bus 
indicator, which varies only across firms and time (the multi_ind and multi_man indicators vary 
at the firm-5-digit industry level and over time). The vast majority of these firms also own plants 
classified to the business services sector, (see table 1), which includes financial management, 
accountancy and legal activities. The positive and significant marginal effect on the interaction 
term between UK-MNEs investing in low-wage locations and industry skill-intensity implies 
that, relative to UK-MNEs not investing in low-wage economies, the propensity to close plants 
by those that are investing in low-wage economies is higher, the lower the skill intensity of the 
industry. 
A final step is to ascertain that it is a higher propensity to exit in the lowest-skill industries that 
is driving this finding. To help clarify this figure 2 shows the average predicted probability of 
exit across plants by ownership type and 4-digit industry skill-intensity using the estimation 
results from column (4). For ease of exposition it also plots a linear prediction through these 
points for each ownership type. The figure shows that for UK-MNEs not investing in low-wage 
economies the predicted exit propensity is roughly even across industries, (the left panel), 
whereas for UK-MNEs that are investing in low-wage economies the predicted exit probability 
is significantly higher in less skill-intensive sectors (i.e. those with a higher share of employees 
with no qualifications).  
 
                                                 
21 The marginal effects shown are generated automatically in Stata which does not recognise an interaction term. 
Strictly the marginal effects for interaction terms should be calculated as follows for the case when a dummy 
variable   is interacted with a continuous variable  :  1 x 2 x
) ( ) ) (( ) ( 2 2 2 1 2 12 2 12 2
1








. Calculation of this for column (3) gives a 
mean value of 0.559 (positive for all values, ranging from 0.109 to 0.714), and for column (4) a mean value of 
0.521 (from 0.108 to 0.705). These are very close to, and of the same sign as the marginal effects reported in table 
4. I also estimated each specification in table 4 as a linear probability model and in each case the marginal effects 
on the interaction terms and the associated significance levels were very close to those reported in the table.  
  16Table 4. Exit probits: investment in low-wage economies and exit  
Dependent variable=1 if exit in t 
or t+1 
Exit over 2 years,  pooled cross sections 
 Marginal effects (z-statistics) 











-0.010   
(-48.15) 
-0.010   
(-48.15) 
-0.010   
(-48.22) 
-0.008   
(-9.80) 
-0.008   
(-9.98) 
Ln(empment)it
-0.029   
(-33.03) 
-0.029   
(-33.05) 
-0.029   
(-33.14) 
-0.042   
(-7.33) 









0.107   
(3.79) 
0.105   
(3.71) 
Multi_manit
0.031   
(6.46) 
0.031   
(6.47) 
0.031   
(6.43) 
0.085   
(2.56) 
0.081   
(2.46) 
Multi_busit
0.076   
(7.16) 
0.076   
(7.15) 
0.076   
(7.15) 
0.010   
(0.53) 
0.014   
(0.77) 
Foreign-ownedit
0.048   
(5.39) 
0.048   
(5.39) 
0.040   
(2.13)    
UK-MNEit
0.030   
(2.54)      
Low wage UK-MNEit     0.032   
(1.77) 
-0.044   
(-1.79) 
-0.072   
(-2.32) 
-0.014   
(-0.60) 
Not low wage UK-MNEit     0.029   
(2.32) 
0.009   
(0.46)     
Foreign-ownedit * 4-digit share 
employees no qualsj
    0.052   
(0.52)     
Low wage UK-MNEit * 4-digit 
share employees no qualsj
    0.529   
(3.47) 
0.533   
(2.91)   
Not low wage UK-MNEit * 4-
digit share employees no qualsj
    0.116   
(1.31)     
4-digit share employees no qualsj      -0.147   
(-0.91)   
Low wage UK-MNEit * Low skillj      0.079   
(2.38) 
Low wage UK-MNEit * Medium 
skillj
     0.015   
(0.38) 
Low skillj      0.010   
(0.36)   
Medium skillj      0.031   
(1.32) 
4-digit industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes     
2-digit industry dummies        Yes  Yes 
Region  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LL  -185432.5 -185432.5 -185413.5  -5663.3  -5662.3 
Obs  358,573 358,573 358,573  10,915  10,915 
Note: estimation is on two cross sections 1998-1999 and 2000-2001. Standard errors clustered at the firm level. The 
table shows marginal effects and z-ratios in parentheses. Low wage UK-MNEs have outward FDI to countries with 
GDP per capita less than 10% of the UK.  
Source: author’s calculations using ARD plant population and AFDI data (source: ONS), and the LFS. 
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Industry share employees no qualifications
Graphs by ownership type
 
Note: Skill-intensity is measured using the proportion of employees in a 4-digit industry with no qualifications. 
Predicted exit probabilities are averages derived from column (4) of table 4. 
Source: author’s calculations using ARD plant population and AFDI (source: ONS) and the LFS. 
 
This is also shown in column (5) of table 4 where the continuous measure of skill-intensity is 
replaced with dummy variables for the third of the distribution of industry skill-intensities in 
which a plant lies, Low skillj (lowest skill-intensity third) and Medium skillj (middle third), with 
the highest skill-intensity third as the omitted category. This specification also ensures that the 
previous results are not driven by outlying values of the continuous measure of skill-intensity. 
As shown by the positive and significant marginal effect on the interaction between the dummy 
for a UK-MNE investing in a low wage economy and Low skillj, it is in the lowest-skill 
industries that plants owned by UK-MNEs investing in low-wage economies are significantly 
more likely to exit. The results also show that there is no significant difference in the propensity 
to exit across plants owned by the two types of UK-MNEs in the other two thirds of the industry 
skill distribution. This suggests that these firms are behaving in a manner consistent with 
vertical FDI, and more specifically are decreasing UK activity in the lowest-skill sectors in line 
with the theoretical predictions of these models. The results imply that plants in the lowest-skill 
industries, for example in the textiles and clothing sectors, that are owned by UK-MNEs 
  18investing in low-wage economies, are around 8 percentage points more likely to close than those 
owned by UK-MNEs that are not investing in low-wage economies.  
Table A3 in the Appendix performs a sample split underlying these results, and estimates 
separately on plants in the top and bottom thirds of industries ranked by skill-intensity, allowing 
all coefficients to vary across the two groups of industries. Again, the results show that plants in 
the least skill-intensive industries are more likely to close if they are part of UK-MNEs investing 
in low-wage economies, compared to those owned by UK-MNEs that are not, and that there is 
no difference in the propensity to exit across the two firm types in high-skill industries.  
Finally, table A4 in the Appendix re-estimates the specifications from columns (3) and (4) of 
table 4 on a single cross section of data with exit defined over a four year period 1998 to 2001. 
In columns (1) and (2) of table A4 low wage UK-MNEs are defined based on their investment 
status in 1998 (year t), and in column (3) on the basis of whether they are observed to have 
overseas activity in a low wage economy at any point over the period 1998 to 2001. The results 
based on exit over this longer period are in line with my main findings. I now go on to present a 
series of further exercises to check the robustness of my results. 
4.1  Robustness 1: alternative definitions of investment in low-wage economies 
Table 5 shows results using alternative definitions of low-wage economies. All results are based 
on UK-MNEs only. Columns (1) and (2) use definitions of a low-wage economy as one with 
GDP per capita of less than 5% and less than 25% of UK per capita GDP respectively. The 
results are very similar to those in column (4) of table 4, with a lower estimated marginal effect 
using the less than 25% of UK per capita GDP definition which includes a larger group of low-
wage countries. 
Column (3) uses specific groups of countries from the outward FDI data. I use three groups: 
South and East Asia, including China and India, Eastern Europe and Africa. Estimation is thus 
relative to firms only undertaking outward investment to all other economies. For plants owned 
by firms that are investing in South and East Asia, I continue to find that the propensity to exit is 
higher, the lower the skill intensity of the industry. If anything the pattern is opposite for plants 
that are owned by firms investing in Eastern Europe, where the interaction term is negative but 
insignificant.
22 I find no systematic pattern for firms investing in Africa. Investments in African 
                                                 
22 Konings and Murphy (2001) do not find evidence of substitutability of manufacturing employment between EU 
parent firms and their affiliates in Central and Eastern Europe.  
  19economies may be driven by access to natural resources, and hence may not be substitutes for 
UK-based activity. 
Table 5. Alternative definitions of investment into low-wage economies 
Dependent variable=1 if exit in t or t+1 UK-MNEs 
 
(< 5% UK 




(< 25% UK 








-0.066   
(-2.11)   
-0.064   
(-2.07)   
Low wage UK-MNEit * 4-digit industry share 
employees no qualsj   
0.522   
(2.88) 
0.451   
(2.59)   
Eastern Europeit
    0.046   
(1.16) 
Africait
    0.012  
(0.32) 
South and East Asiait
    -0.105   
(-2.80) 
Eastern Europeit * 4-digit industry share 
employees no quals j
    -0.217   
(-1.08) 
Africait * 4-digit industry share employees no 
quals j
    0.116   
(0.54) 
South and East Asiait * 4-digit industry share 
employees no quals j
    0.606   
(2.65) 
4-digit industry share employees no qualsj
-0.127   
(-0.76) 
-0.160   
(-0.96) 
-0.184   
(-1.13) 
Controls: Ageit, Ln(empment)it, Multi_indit, 
Multi_manit, Multi_busit
Yes Yes  Yes 
2-digit industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
LL -5663.5  -5665.8  -5656.6 
Obs 10,915  10,915  10,915 
Notes: estimation is on two cross sections 1998-1999 and 2000-2001. Standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
Table shows marginal effects and z-ratios in parentheses. Column (1), (2) low wage UK-MNEs have outward FDI 
to countries with GDP per capita less than 5%, 25% of the UK respectively. 
Source: author’s calculations using ARD plant population and AFDI data (source: ONS) and the LFS. 
4.2  Robustness 2: alternative measures of industry skill intensity 
Table 6 checks robustness against alternative definitions of industry skill intensity. Columns (1), 
(2) and (3) use 5-digit industry level measures constructed from the ARD establishment-level 
sample: capital intensity (capital stock per employee); the skilled worker share of the wage bill; 
and the average annual wage. Column (4) uses an alternative 4-digit industry wage measure, the 
hourly wage as measured in the ASHE. The final column uses a further 4-digit industry level 
measure derived from the LFS, the share of employees reporting having degree level or 
equivalent or above qualifications. Contrary to the skill-intensity measure used so far, all of 
these measures would be expected to be increasing in the skill-intensity of the industry.  
  20The estimated marginal effects on the interaction terms for the first two measures, capital 
intensity and the skilled worker share of the wage bill, are negative and significant at the 1% and 
10% level respectively and provide support for my main findings. The first measure indicates 
that for plants owned by UK-MNEs investing in low-wage economies the propensity to exit is 
decreasing in the capital intensity of the industry, or put another way, it is higher the more 
labour-intensive is the industry. An increase in capital intensity of 100 (the mean and standard 
deviation are 87.8 and 133.5 thousands of pounds per worker) is associated with a decrease in 
the propensity to exit of around 7 percentage points. The second measure is equivalent to the 
main variable used to measure the skill intensity of production in Head and Ries (2002). The 
results imply that an increase in the skilled worker wage bill share of 0.10 (the mean is 0.46 and 
the standard deviation 0.16), is associated with a decrease in the propensity to exit of around 2 
percentage points for plants owned by UK-MNEs investing in low-wage economies, over and 
above that for plants owned by UK-MNEs that are not investing in low-wage economies. 
Table 6. Alternative definitions of low-skill, low-wage industries in the UK  

































0.066   
(2.68) 
0.095   
(1.89) 
0.044   
(0.54) 
0.037   
(0.40) 
0.004   
(0.16) 
Low wage UK-MNEit * Industry 
characteristic  
-0.0007   
(-3.65) 
-0.175   
(-1.78) 
-0.002   
(-0.49) 
-0.003   
(-0.33) 
0.038   
(0.27) 
Industry characteristic 
-0.0001   
(-1.24) 
-0.205   
(-2.86) 
0.004   
(1.03) 
-0.002   
(-0.23) 
-0.130   
(-1.27) 
Controls: Ageit, Ln(empment)it, 
Multi_indit, Multi_manit, 
Multi_busit
Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
2-digit industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region  dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time  dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
LL  -5649.7  -5652.6  -5672.7 -5673.5 -5672.0 
Obs  10,915  10,915  10,915 10,915 10,915 
Notes: capital intensity: £1000s capital stock per employee, 1995. Mean annual wage: £1000 per year, 1995. Mean 
hourly pay £1997. ARD industry characteristics vary at the 5-digit industry level, LFS and ASHE characteristics at 
the 4-digit level. Estimation is on two cross sections 1998-1999 and 2000-2001. Standard errors clustered at the 
firm level. Table shows marginal effects and z-ratios in parentheses. Low wage UK-MNEs have outward FDI to 
countries with GDP per capita less than 10% of the UK.  
Source: author’s calculations using ARD plant population, establishment sample and AFDI data (source: ONS), the 
LFS and the ASHE. 
The interaction terms using the final three measures are not statistically significant. It is possible 
that these provide less precise measures of skill-intensity. The share of employees with degree 
level or above qualifications is unlikely to capture the characteristics of low-skill industries as 
  21accurately as my main measure (the share of employees with no qualifications). The two wage 
measures will also be affected by factors other than industry skill levels. 
4.3  Robustness 3: controlling for further characteristics 
Finally I use the establishment-level sample to control for further characteristics. These data, 
described in section 3.2, enable me to include establishment-level measures of capital intensity 
and total factor productivity in line with the study by Bernard and Jensen (2005). These data do 
have some problems in that they will understate exit by multi-plant establishments, and the 
sample will likely be biased towards large (and hence surviving) establishments. To try to deal 
with this second issue to some extent I weight observations by the inverse of their sampling 
probabilities. 
As expected the results in column (1) of Table 7 indicate that the probability of exit is 
decreasing in establishment capital intensity and productivity, although only the latter variable is 
statistically significant. Conditional on total factor productivity, size (measured by employment) 
is no longer significant. The results also suggest that on average establishments owned by UK-
MNEs investing low wage economies are more likely to exit than those owned by other types of 
firm. Column (2) includes the interaction terms. The estimated marginal effect on the interaction 
term using the dummy for UK-MNEs investing in low-wage economies is positive and is larger 
than that for the other two types of multinational firms, but it is only statistically significant at 
the 15% level. 
In the final two columns I split the sample of establishments into those in the lowest-skill third 
of the industry skill intensity distribution and those in the highest-skill third. Column (3) shows 
that in low-skill industries it is only those establishments owned by UK-MNEs investing in low-
wage economies that are significantly more likely to exit compared to the other groups. The 
marginal effect for low wage UK-MNEs (0.107) is significantly different to those for the other 
two types of multinationals at the 5% level. Column (4) shows that establishments owned by 
UK-MNEs investing in low-wage economies are also the most likely to exit in high-skill 
industries, but in this case the marginal effect is not statistically different to the estimated 
marginal effects for the other two types of multinationals. Overall this pattern of results is 
supportive of my main findings. 
  22Table 7. Exit probits, establishment-level data 

















-0.003   
(-7.25) 
-0.003   
(-7.23) 
-0.003   
(-4.13) 
-0.003   
(-4.33) 
Ln(empment)it
-0.003   
(-1.34) 
-0.003   
(-1.33) 
-0.004   
(-0.96) 
-0.005   
(-1.17) 
Ln (K/L) it  
-0.005   
(-1.53) 
-0.005   
(-1.53) 
-0.012   
(-2.17) 
-0.011   
(-1.78) 
Ln (TFP) it
-0.009   
(-2.00) 
-0.009   
(-1.98) 
-0.025   
(-2.25) 
-0.002   
(-0.35) 
Multi_indit
0.098   
(6.96) 
0.098   
(6.98) 
0.120   
(5.15) 
0.095   
(4.12) 
Multi_manit
0.053   
(4.75) 
0.053   
(4.77) 
0.071   
(3.75) 
0.061   
(3.05) 
Multi_busit
0.021   
(1.82) 
0.021   
(1.78) 
0.018   
(0.94) 
0.018   
(0.93) 
Foreign-ownedit
0.025   
(2.55) 
0.053   
(2.15) 
-0.0002   
(-0.01) 
0.038   
(2.21) 
Low wage UK-MNEit  
0.066   
(3.31) 
0.015   
(0.51) 
0.107   
(2.50) 
0.070   
(2.70) 
Not low wage UK-MNEit  
0.023   
(1.87) 
0.020   
(0.75) 
0.018   
(0.90) 
0.035   
(1.59) 
Foreign-ownedit * 4-digit share 
employees no qualsj
  -0.161   
(-1.23)    
Low wage UK-MNEit * 4-digit share 
employees no quals j
  0.270   
(1.51)    
Not low wage UK-MNEit * 4-digit 
share employees no quals j
  0.020   
(0.15)    
4-digit share employees no quals j   -0.025   
(-0.35) 
-0.185   
(-1.17) 
0.330   
(1.38) 
2-digit industry dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time  dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LL  -4505.7 -4503.3 -1541.9 -1595.2 
Obs 13,387  13,387  4,584  4,456 
Notes: estimation is on two cross sections 1998-1999 and 2000-2001. Standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
Table shows marginal effects and z-ratios in parentheses. Low wage UK-MNEs have outward FDI to countries with 
GDP per capita less than 10% of the UK. All specifications are weighted using inverse sampling probabilities. 
Source: author’s calculations using ARD establishment sample, establishment population and AFDI data (source: 
ONS) and the LFS. 
 
5  Conclusions 
This paper has presented empirical evidence that UK multinationals investing abroad in low-
wage economies are acting in line with the predictions of theories of vertical foreign direct 
investment. Specifically, I find that plants in low skill-intensity sectors owned by UK 
multinationals investing in low-wage economies are significantly more likely to exit than those 
  23owned by UK multinationals that are not investing in low-wage economies, and importantly, 
that this difference is not mirrored for plants in high-skill sectors.  
By comparing the behaviour of multinational firms making different geographic outward 
investments, I extend the literature on firm characteristics and plant closures. I also confirm 
previous findings that multinational firms, either domestic or foreign-owned, are more likely to 
shut down plants than non-multinational firms, and hence exhibit more flexibility in 
organisational restructuring. 
Given increasing geographic mobility of economic activity and the fact that multinational firms 
make up significant proportions of employment in economies such as the US and UK, these 
findings have potential implications for the industrial composition of employment in OECD 
economies. However the findings in this paper were restricted to the manufacturing sector. A 
natural extension would be to examine effects of outward FDI on mobile service sector 
activities. 
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  26Appendix 
Table A1. Low wage countries and tax havens 
Low-wage economies 
Albania Ecuador  Jordan  Rwanda 
Algeria Egypt  Kenya  Senegal 
Angola El  Salvador  Laos  Sierra  Leone 
Bangladesh Equatorial  Guinea  Madagascar  Sri  Lanka 
Benin Ethiopia  Malawi  Sudan 
Bolivia Ghana  Mali  Suriname 
Bulgaria Guatemala Morocco Syria 
Burkina Faso  Guinea  Mozambique  Tanzania 
Cameroon Guyana  Nicaragua  Togo 
Cape Verde  Haiti  Niger  Tonga 
Central African Republic  India  Nigeria  Vietnam 
Chad Indonesia  Pakistan  Zaire 
China Israel  Papua  New  Guinea  Zambia 
Congo Iran  Paraguay  Zimbabwe 
Djibouti Ivory  Coast  Philippines   
Dominican Republic  Jamaica  Romania   
Tax havens 
Antigua  Bermuda  Isle of Man  St Kitts and Nevis 
Bahamas  Channel Islands  Liechtenstein  St Lucia 
Bahrain Cyprus  Luxembourg  St  Vincent 
Barbados Gibraltar  Macao 
Belize Grenada  Netherlands  Antilles 
Turks and Caicos Islands 
 
Table A2. Industry skill intensity: share of employees with no qualifications 2-digit 
industry average 
2-digit industry  Share no qualifications 
15 Food and beverages  0.17 
16 Tobacco  0.15 
17 Textiles  0.30 
18 Clothing  0.41 
19 Leather  0.33 
20 Wood and wood products  0.20 
21 Pulp, paper and paper products  0.19 
22 Publishing and printing  0.10 
23 Coke, refined petroleum products  0.05 
24 Chemicals  0.11 
25 Rubber and plastics  0.23 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products  0.21 
27 Basic metals  0.15 
28 Fabricated metal products  0.18 
29 Machinery and equipment  0.12 
30 Office machinery and computers  0.07 
31 Electrical Machinery  0.17 
32 Radio, TV and communication equipment  0.13 
33 Medical, precision and optical instruments  0.11 
34 Motor vehicles  0.16 
35 Other transport equipment  0.12 
36 Furniture, manufacturing not elsewhere classified  0.21 
37 Re-cycling  0.21 
Total  0.18 
Note: average across 4-digit industries within 2-digit industry 
Source: author’s calculations using LFS spring quarters 1995 to 2003. 
  27Table A3. Sample split, investment in low-wage economies and exit, UK-MNEs 






Low wage UK-MNE it 0.078   
(2.80) 
0.006   
(0.28) 
Controls: Ageit, Ln(empment)it, Multi_indit, Multi_manit, 
Multi_busit,   
Yes Yes 
2-digit industry dummies  Yes  Yes 
Region dummies  Yes  Yes 
Time dummies  Yes  Yes 
LL -1648.0  -2614.8 
Obs 3,195  5,156 
Notes: estimation is on two cross sections 1998-1999 and 2000-2001. Standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
Table shows marginal effects and z-ratios in parentheses. Low wage UK-MNEs have outward FDI to countries with 
GDP per capita less than 10% of the UK. Low and high skill industries are the top and bottom thirds of the industry 
skill distribution. 
Source: author’s calculations using ARD plant population and AFDI data (source: ONS) and the LFS. 
Table A4. Investment in low-wage economies and exit, single cross-section 















1998 to 2001 
(3) 
Foreign-ownedi
0.098   
(2.39)     
Low wage UK-MNEi  
-0.021   
(-0.48) 
-0.048   
(-0.84) 
-0.078   
(-1.74) 
Not low wage UK-MNEi  
-0.022   
(-0.46)     
Foreign-ownedi * 4-digit share employees no 
qualsj
-0.197   
(-1.01)     
Low wage UK-MNEi * 4-digit share employees 
no qualsj
0.520   
(2.23) 
0.503   
(1.57) 
0.621   
(2.54) 
Not low wage UK-MNEi * 4-digit share 
employees no qualsj
0.297   
(1.28)     
4-digit share employees no qualsj   -0.023   
(-0.08) 
-0.453   
(-1.71) 
Controls: Ageit, Ln(empment)it, Multi_indit, 
Multi_manit, Multi_busit,   
Yes Yes Yes 
4-digit industry dummies  Yes     
2-digit industry dummies    Yes  Yes 
Region  dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
Time  dummies  Yes Yes Yes 
LL  -119089.9 -3310.9 -5662.3 
Obs 181,264  5,243  10,915 
Notes: estimation is on a single cross section 1998-2001. Standard errors clustered at the firm level. Table shows 
marginal effects and z-ratios in parentheses. Low wage UK-MNEs have outward FDI to countries with GDP per 
capita less than 10% of the UK. Columns (1) and (2) define low wage UK-MNEs based on 1998 investments. 
Column (3) defines a low wage UK-MNE as a firm that is observed to be investing in a low wage economy in any 
year 1998 to 2001.  
Source: author’s calculations using ARD plant population and AFDI data (source: ONS) and the LFS. 
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